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Russia has a vested political interest in 
the eastern Baltics; yet acting upon this 
interest is either difficult or altogether im-
possible when it comes to the Baltic states. 
For 20 years, the Russian Federation has 
been actively promoting a model of mutually 
beneficial cooperation. Anti-Russian discour-
se of the Baltic states political elites, driven by 
their own wish to maintain political monopo-
ly, halts most co-operation efforts. 
It is time to accept that the previous 
model of cooperation with the Baltic states 
is now irrelevant, and that these states now 
form the avant-garde of anti-Russian move-
ment; whether they will or, indeed, shall be 
held accountable for that is another unan-
swered question. The author of this article 
believes that the current model is unprece-
dented and failing so, it is unwise to speak 
of its long-term application. 
The aim of this study is to draw some 
conclusions on the 25 years of intergovern-
mental relations between Russia and the 
Baltic states. The author uses a number of 
cross-disciplinary methods and relies heav-
ily on the method of historical analysis. It is 
concluded that there are circumstances 
rendering mutual cooperation impossible, 
however beneficial such cooperation may 
seem. Conservation of the current political 
system will inevitably lead to economic 
stagnation in the Baltic states. If external 
pressures continue to rise and relations 
with Russia continue to deteriorate, destru-
ction of economic and political systems of the 
neighboring states may become a reality. 
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Russian interests in the Baltic Sea region are a long-term priority of the 
country’s foreign policy. They emerged and developed long ago and proved 
more stable than the state itself (under any of its many ephemeral names). 
Contemporary Russian policy in this region can be traced back to the 
times of Kievan Rus. In the Novgorod feudal republic, Baltic policy was the 
cornerstone of international political and economic relations. In Novgorod, 
communication with other states led to the emergence of several important 
practical approaches to international cooperation, some of which are listed 
below. 
1) Since the 13th century, treaties between the Novgorod Republic and 
Sweden contained clear rules of bilateral trade, identified the legal status of 
warehouses and other facilities, and specified the scope and mandate of writs 
granting privileges and protection, etc. 
2) Treaties between the Novgorod Republic and the Livonian order con-
tained detailed descriptions of state border demarcation, i. e. showed a trend 
towards the contractual formalisation of border delimitation. 
3) Administrative and economic activities in the Novgorod and Pskov 
feudal regions were strongly influenced by the western European (Hanseatic, 
German, and Scandinavian) legal and economic systems. 
4) Despite their focus on trade relations, Novgorod and Pskov retained 
the ability to repel attacks from the West. The years 1240 and 1242 proved 
that an effective economic regime could not survive without sufficient mili-
tary and political support. 
In the times of the Novgorod feudal republic — largely under the influ-
ence of the Western partners — the Russian state was integrated into the sys-
tem of international political and economic relations. 
The historical significance of Russian Baltic and Scandinavian policies 
lies in that the continuity of state independence was never broken in this 
area, even during feudal fragmentation and the Mongol Invasion. 
A key feature of the Russian Baltic policy was its strong economic bend. 
As early as the 12—13th centuries, the priorities of economic partnership 
overshadowed the needs of territorial expansion. This becomes especially 
clear if one studies the Novgorod acts of the 12—15th centuries collected by 
S. N. Valk [1] and V. L. Yanin [2]. 
Regional systems of international relations are typically characterized by 
having a relatively large number of actors on a rather small territory. How-
ever, this has not always been true for the regions in question. Consider this 
quote, “His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Russia, His Imperial Majesty 
the Emperor of Germany and Prussia, His Majesty the King of Denmark, 
and His Majesty the King of Sweden desire to strengthen the bonds of amity 
and good neighbourhood between their states thus granting universal 
peace… If any events shall threaten the territorial order in the countries of 
the Baltic Sea, the four undersigned governments shall enter into communi-
cation to agree upon the measures that would be deemed effective in sup-
porting the said order” [3, p. 400]. It shows that a little more than a century 
ago the map of the region looked rather different. In effect, two empires 
shaped the system of international relations in the region. The status quo sa-
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tisfied all the parties. Qualitative changes on the political map could occur 
only if the German and Russian Empires were to disintegrate at the same 
time, which they ended up doing in 1917—1918. 
Our analysis is based on the following assumptions: 
 Russia has broad economic, military, and political interests in the Bal-
tic region. These interests are rather evident, even if they are not acknow-
ledged by the countries in question, and include territories lying at a distance 
of thousands of kilometres from their borders. 
 Economic interests are further fuelled by the fact that a significant 
proportion of Russian external trade (including that with non-Baltic partners, 
for instance, the US, Canada, and Cuba) is conducted via the Baltic Sea. The 
Kaliningrad exclave gets its supplies this way; gas is exported to Europe 
through the Nord Stream offshore pipeline. 
 Opportunities to promote these interests largely depend on the degree 
of cooperation with the neighbours in the region. Even in 2103—2014, al-
most 40 % of Russian transit was handled by the ports of the Baltics. Twenty 
years ago, this proportion was twice as high. 
 Since 1993 — when the official foreign policy was first formulated in 
the eponymous document — said policy has been perceived differently in 
the Baltics and Finland. While de jure the countries express a joint opinion 
on the referendum in Crimea, they use different political rhetoric and do not 
have a single perspective on the prospects of the conflict and their roles in it. 
Russia, on the other hand, in its founding foreign policy document has a sin-
gle vision of relations with partners in the East Baltic. So the problem re-
mains: Russian current foreign policy is perceived differently in Finland and 
the Baltics. 
 Russia has to find such ways to promote its interest in the region that 
would be in line with the country’s current opportunities and the present sys-
tem of political and economic relations in the world and in Europe. It is also 
important to take into account that the Baltics foreign policy towards Russia 
and Russia’s foreign policy towards the Baltics are projections of the Euro-
pean vector of international relations. In recent years, a lot of scholars have 
been speaking of the unique prognostic function of the Russo-Baltic rela-
tions. The current situation in between Russia and the Baltics is an approxi-
mation of the future of Russian-European relations. The removal of the So-
viet war memorial in central Tallinn (Estonia) preceded the launch of the 
Eastern Partnership. The Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius (Lithuania) 
preceded the launch of destruction of the Ukrainian state and the hybrid war 
against Russia. There can be no doubt that the upcoming Eastern Partnership 
summit in Riga (Latvia) is going to be of significant importance [4]. 
 Unfortunately, despite common interests, Russian relations with its 
north-western neighbours, in particular, those in the Baltic region, remain 
rather complicated. The Baltic region, a border area for both Russia and the 
EU, is heavily affected by geopolitical changes. Therefore, the economic and 
political composition of the region should take into account the interests of 
the European Union and the Russian Federation. This is the only way to en-
sure sustainable economic development of the region. 
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This article considers the current condition and prospects for the eco-
nomic and political development of the east Baltic States in the context of 
their cooperation with Russia. A specific feature of this area is that all of the 
region’s modern states were once territories of the Russian Empire, in whole 
or in part (the Republic of Poland). In the 21st century, Finland, Estonia, Lat-
via, Lithuania, Poland, and Russia remain neighbours. Being neighbours 
geographically is one thing, political and economic cooperation is another, 
more significant, matter. Over the past 24 years, the region has seen changes 
not only on its political maps, but also in certain cooperation models that 
have developed between the states of the east Baltics. 
It would be a simplification to distinguish between two models of rela-
tions between Russia and its neighbours in the east Baltics. One model is 
used in Moscow-Helsinki relations, the second in the Baltics-Russia rela-
tions. These relations are conducted on conditions of openness in foreign 
trade and growing partnership between Russian and the EU. Although eco-
nomic, political, and legal frameworks are formally the same, both economic 
and political relations between Russia and Finland differ considerably from 
those between Russia and the Baltics. In our opinion, this situation was trig-
gered by the policies of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania that ignore objective 
economic logic of mutually beneficial relations. 
A constant emphasis on objective historical problems fulfils the function 
of preserving the anti-Russian sentiment at the level of elites, which convert 
Russophobic rhetoric into political and, to a degree, economic capital. At the 
same time, Russia is committed to the depoliticisation of economic coopera-
tion, joint efforts to solve regional problems, and taking discussion on com-
plicated issues from the political to the expert level. It is worth stressing that 
this process requires mutual participation, which is hardly the case today, nor 
did it really happen in the past. 
It is also worth noting that “the conscious distortion of the essence of the 
past and current relations between Russia and the Baltics has always been an 
integral part of the major attack on Russian history” [5]. One might see it as 
an exaggeration. In this context, it is worth quoting an eminent author: “To 
make themselves the master of memory and forgetfulness is one of the great 
preoccupations of the classes, groups, and individuals who have dominated 
and continue to dominate historical societies” [6]. This is not a quote from 
an Orwell novel, but an opinion voiced by the French historian and sociolo-
gist Jacque Le Goff. Indeed, one cannot but notice that, in the Baltics, his-
torical works are sometimes not only written by professionals — historians 
and political scientists — but also published as official government materials 
[7], which are often prepared by acting politicians of the highest ranks. Thus, 
groundwork for an ideology is laid. E. Ponomareva and L. Shishelina stress 
that “of course, one can understand historical traumas, understand different 
attitudes to different dramatic events. However, today, one cannot justify 
reproducing a distorted, negative image of a neighbouring country and its 
people, animosity and antipathy towards them, as well as conscious devia-




Of course, there are lawyers, historians, and political scientists in the 
Baltics who have an independent view on the events of 1918—1920 and 
1939—1940 [9; 10]. Yet the prevalent view is a different, official interpreta-
tion based on the selective succession principle, occupation doctrine, and 
ostentatious anti-Russian sentiment [11—13]. 
The stance taken by Tallinn, Riga, and Vilnius in their dialogue with 
Russia is not consistent with the countries’ economic and political opportu-
nities. United Europe is not inclined to radicalise relations with Russia ac-
cording to the Lithuanian scenario, which nevertheless is supported on both 
sides of the Atlantic and, thus, is promoted through several countries of new 
Europe, predominantly the Baltics. 
The President of Estonia, Toomas Hendrik Ilves (then Minister of For-
eign Affairs), clearly formulated his vision of Russia: “…there is no one in 
the Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs who is interested in the neighbour-
hood with Russia. The future relations with the West are our main concern” 
[14]. 
This motto won him the Presidency. However, in Russia, this thesis was 
not heard by everyone. Reports were prepared by the Council for Foreign 
and Defence Policy and a number of affiliated structures [15—20]. These 
documents almost ignored the negative experience of Russian-Estonian Re-
lations. Only after the removal of the Bronze Soldier memorial and the 2008 
hostilities in Ossetia, the deadlock in the Baltics-Russia relations became 
evident. An analysis of current practices in the Baltics-Russian relations 
shows that the Baltics increasingly become part of the political periphery. 
In these conditions, Russia should not react to slight changes in the for-
eign policies of its neighbours. One should welcome the steps taken by the 
partners towards adjusting and solving the most acute problems. A good ex-
ample is Estonia taking steps towards the ratification of a border treaty under 
mutually agreed terms. However, one should not jump at conclusions. Russia 
should seek a general adjustment in the neighbours’ foreign policy towards 
pragmatic cooperation without looking for a compromise over key political 
and economic issues. 
Russia should treat elements of inadequate perception of the country le-
niently. Certain stages of Russian history and foreign policy development do 
not comply with modern international law. At the same time, there is a need 
to oppose all attempts to convince Russian and international public of the 
responsibility of Russia and its citizens for the actions taken by the USSR in 
the 20th century. 
Russia needs to safeguard all formal and nonformal characteristics of 
state sovereignty. This general principle holds especially true for the Baltic 
Sea region, which serves as a platform for political processes posing a direct 
threat to Russian interests. 
In the conditions of emerging economic and political uncertainty in 
Europe and in the world, there is an increasing need to position Russia as an 
integral part of European civilisation and a natural ally of the major Euro-
pean integration association. 
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The concept of “missed opportunities” cannot be used as a reproach to 
Russian neighbours. There is a need to treat certain common history events 
equitably and overcome historical phobias. The experience of Finnish-
Russian relations proves that it is possible. 
When analysing the speeches of top politicians and experts from Ger-
many, France, Italy, and the UK, one encounters different opinions and at-
tempts to carry out a comprehensive analysis of complicated processes re-
sulting in the crisis in the EU-Russia relations. However, Tallinn, Riga and, 
in particular, Vilnius aim to develop a unified position on foreign policy is-
sues. Members of the Latvian Harmony party and the Estonian Centre Party, 
who expressed cautious doubts as to the soundness of the unambiguous as-
sessment of the current processes, were all but accused of high treason. 
The implementation of Russian interests in relations with the Baltics is 
forestalled only by the Baltics. Russian diplomats and experts are under-
standably weary of the general trends observed in the Baltics-Russian rela-
tions over the past 25 years. However, despite this disappointment, Russian 
interests have to be well structured, moreover, there is a need for a state pol-
icy that would be clear to Russia and its neighbours. 
In the context of Russian interests in the Baltics, one should consider the 
evolution of Russian foreign policy concepts. The first one was adopted in 
1993, the last one in 2013 [21—23]. Twenty years constitute a period that 
can be considered not only in terms of policy, but also in terms of history. 
The 1993 concept has a page and a half dedicated to the Baltics — as many 
as to the USA. However, the 2013 concept does not mention the Baltics. In-
stead, it focuses on the Baltic Sea region. The page had been turned. The 
Baltic States, Russian geographic neighbours, are not mentioned in the con-
cept, but Australia is. The period when Russia was ready to make a step to-
wards its partners and offer a mutually beneficial dialogue even through 
trade-offs seems to have ended. 
When considering Russian interests in the Baltics (the major issue) and 
those of the Baltics in Russia (a secondary issue for Russia), one should take 
into account both spatial and historical contexts. Otherwise, it is difficult to 
structure these interests and almost impossible to answer the question as to 
what problems hinder their implementation. 
In theoretical terms, “against the background of political and economic 
stereotypes, there is a possibility of the Baltics abandoning single-vector fo-
reign policy for the multi-vector model, i. e. unlocking the potential of tradi-
tional geographical and historical ties” [24]. This option cannot be excluded. 
A diplomat is a person who never says never (otherwise, they are not a diplo-
mat). Diplomacy is not only an area of human activity, but also — ideally — 
an art. However, for the political elites of the Baltics, Russia remains “an ex-
ternal, alien to Europe state — a Siberian Nigeria or Algeria.” Therefore, “it 
seems logical to pursue an egoistic policy towards Russia, which resolves in-
to gaining access to its raw materials and transit routes, depriving the coun-
try of natural competitive advantages, and simultaneous avoidance of possi-
ble ‘soft security’ risks” [25]. 
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In conclusion, it is worth stressing that Russian state interests can be 
structured as follows: 
 formalising the state border between Russia and the Baltics, i. e. the 
ratification of the border treaty with Estonia; 
 developing transport and energy infrastructure in the Kaliningrad ex-
clave, which may prompt amore effective cooperation with the Baltics. With 
Polish support, Lithuania has virtually blocked the construction of the Baltic 
NPP. However, it did not and could not facilitate the construction of an NPP 
in the country. 
 protecting the rights of ethnic Russians in the Baltics as a crucial and 
long-term objective of the Russian policy in the region. This policy extends to 
both ethnic Russians and Russian citizens permanently residing in the Baltics. 
 developing cooperation in the framework of regional organisations. 
These international organisations should not turn into a platform for coordi-
nating anti-Russian policy. 
The Baltics are a very inconvenient object for cooperation; however, any 
positive result in this area will serve as convincing evidence of the general 
efficiency of Russia’s foreign policy, at least, of its European vector. 
In compliance with the rules and practices of international law, the Baltic 
States are to be considered equal and important partners, which suggests 
equal responsibility of partners. This concerns the political statements of the 
president of Lithuania, and the marches of SS veterans in Riga on March 16, 
2015, and such practical actions as the NATO military parade in the Esto-
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